



## State Intervention, External Spoilers, and the Durability of Peace Agreements

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Keywords:	Civil war, Peace agreement, Negotiated settlement, State intervention, Duration analysis/Duration model, External spoilers
Abstract:	<p>How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners' level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener's economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states' satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant</p>

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## Introduction

During the still borne Gbadolite Peace Process of 1989 between the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency and the Soviet-supported People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in Angola, the UNITA's leader Savimbi declared, "[i]f America did not support UNITA, first UNITA could be weakened and you don't negotiate with weak people." He continued, "[i]t is because UNITA is strong that the MPLA [the government] is talking," tying UNITA's strength during the negotiation process to the ongoing support of their ally, the United States (Reed 1989). After three failed peace agreements, durable peace finally came to Angola in 2002 with the Luena Memorandum, which was supported by the United States. Angola's long journey to peace stands in contrast to the Mozambican peace process where the first peace agreement signed between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government succeeded in ending the violence in 1992 with broad support from the major and regional powers that intervened in the conflict (Goncalves 1998).

The discrepancy in these two peace processes begs the question, how does state intervention in civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement durability? The literature is split on the overall effects of third-party interveners on conflict and peace processes. Some studies see third-parties as custodians of peace (Stedman 1997; Walter 2002). However, we also have ample evidence that interveners seek to shape war outcomes in their self-interest, with negative consequences for peace. Extant research shows that third-party intervention protracts civil wars and leads to more casualties (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Regan 2002). Which of these approaches correctly captures the effects of state intervention on the durability of a peace agreement?

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3 While discussing former combatants' commitment to terms of a peace agreement, it is  
4 important to emphasize the role state interveners play in influencing their commitment. In this  
5 paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their wartime  
6 ally in the post-agreement period. A peace agreement introduces a new political status quo to the  
7 post-conflict state. Not only former combatants but also states who sponsored them during the  
8 conflict are stakeholders in the new status quo. In this paper, I argue that the durability of a peace  
9 agreement is dependent upon how satisfied the state interveners are with the policy outcomes of  
10 the peace agreement. I contend that the discrepancy between the two peace processes in Angola  
11 and Mozambique largely stems from the difference in satisfaction of interveners with the post-  
12 agreement status quo.  
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17 The majority of civil conflicts experience multiple state interventions. 67% of the post-  
18 agreement states analyzed for this research experienced intervention from multiple states during  
19 conflict.<sup>1</sup> While some studies have asserted that the presence of multiple interveners complicates  
20 the conflict process and increases its duration (Aydin and Regan 2012; Cunningham 2006), their  
21 interconnected role in shaping the fragile post-agreement peace remains uncharted territory. It is  
22 not only the presence of multiple interveners but also how satisfied they are with the post-  
23 agreement status quo that shapes post-agreement outcomes. An intervener state that is not satisfied  
24 with the post-agreement status quo can undo and spoil other intervener's implementation efforts  
25 by promising wartime support to their ally. Therefore, I also argue that the presence of multiple  
26 interveners with diverse levels of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo will decrease the  
27 durability of peace agreements.  
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56 <sup>1</sup> Data is from the Non-state Actors Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009; 2013).  
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3 Previous literature on conflict and peace discusses the use of signaling by combatants to show  
4 their commitment to war (Thyne 2006) or peace (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). However, signals  
5 can also be used by external sponsors to reveal their levels of satisfaction with the post-agreement  
6 status quo and their willingness to support the implementation or breakdown of the agreement. I  
7 trace state interveners' level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic  
8 and political signals they send. I examine the durability of peace agreements signed between 1985  
9 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners  
10 and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence  
11 between each state intervener's economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state  
12 decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states'  
13 satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace.  
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28 In this study, I define state interveners as states that provided a civil conflict combatant with  
29 military or economic support during conflict. Support or aid extended can be in the form of troops,  
30 weapons and military equipment, logistics, sanctuary, and funds. State interveners, based on this  
31 definition, are also referred to as external supporters, external sponsors, unilateral third-party  
32 interveners, or biased interveners. Furthermore, I use the terms peace agreement and negotiated  
33 settlement interchangeably.  
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42 This article is one of the first studies to examine how state intervention in civil conflict  
43 influences post-agreement peace. It is also one of the first large-N studies on external spoiling of  
44 peace. It brings a novel perspective to spoiling as one of the many options combatants can take  
45 depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of settlement. Theoretically lying at  
46 the intersection of the literature on intervention, peace agreements, and spoiling, the findings will  
47 have significant implications for scholars and practitioners of post-agreement stability.  
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### **Current Scholarship on the Durability of Peace Agreements**

Conflict resolution scholars have examined peace agreement durability along three primary lines of discussion. The first strand of literature focuses on peace agreement provisions. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) assert that power-sharing arrangements in negotiated settlements minimize grievances and increase the durability of negotiated settlements. Military, political, territorial, and economic power-sharing arrangements may be included in the agreement to make sure both the wartime government and the armed opposition are represented to some extent in the post-settlement order (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Disaggregating power-sharing arrangements and building on bargaining models of war (Fearon 1995), Mattes and Savun argue that political power-sharing minimizes commitment problems (2009), making peace more durable. On the other hand, Joshi and Mason (2011) maintain that power-sharing institutions that lead broader coalitions allow for a wide range of groups to acquire representation and therefore solidify peace. They find the size of the governing coalition to expand only with the provision of territorial power-sharing.

Suitable agreement design is elemental in that it should deliver the full implementation of provisions. Some studies, therefore, focus on the implementation stage (DeRouen et al. 2010; Jarstad and Nilsson 2010; Joshi and Quinn 2015; Joshi et al. 2017). Examining a five year implementation period, Jarstad and Nilsson (2010) find that the implementation of territorial and military power-sharing provisions significantly increase the durability of the peace agreement. Also, building on bargaining theory (Fearon 1995), they identify costly signaling as the main causal mechanism. They argue that the costlier the provisions are for the signatories, the more telling their commitment to their implementation will be. Joshi and Quinn (2015, 2017) look at the extent to which the agreement is implemented or the number of policy areas the agreement intends

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3 to cover as a way of parties to commit themselves to peace. DeRouen et al. (2010), on the other  
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5 hand, emphasize how economic factors, namely state capacity, can facilitate implementation. One  
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7 discussion that is often missing from this vein of literature is that a distribution of benefits  
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9 acceptable to all parties lies at the core of power-sharing arrangements (Powell 1996; Werner  
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11 1999).<sup>2</sup>  
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15 Building on the first, the second line of work on post-settlement peace focuses on the  
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17 commitment problems that signatories face and the role of third-party security guarantors in  
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19 alleviating these problems. This group of work sees the recurrence of violence as a tragedy  
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21 stemming from the security dilemma. The uncertainty surrounding the environment arises from  
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23 the vulnerability each party faces when they commit to military terms of settlement (Hoddie and  
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25 Hartzell 2003; Walter 2002).  
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29 In the absence of an internal contract enforcer, third-party security guarantors (Doyle and  
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31 Sambanis 2011; Fortna 2008; Stedman 1997; Walter 2002) are suggested as a potential remedy.  
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33 However, there is a significant distinction between state versus multilateral party involvement in  
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35 peacekeeping. While multilateral peacekeepers may suffer from collective action problems or lack  
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37 of commitment to the cause, states' actions will be dictated by their self-interest. So far, scholars  
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39 seem to focus solely on peacekeeping operations and ignore the role state interveners may play in  
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41 setting or blocking the post-settlement agenda.  
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45 Discussion of spoilers, actors who seek to harm peace processes, is the third primary line of  
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47 literature in the study of agreement durability (Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997;  
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49 Zahar 2010). Stedman (1997) introduces the concept of spoilers as internal actors with actions  
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51 harmful to peace. Newman and Richmond (2006, 4) broaden the scope to external actors who may  
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55 <sup>2</sup> Senese and Quakenbush (2003), Werner (1999), Werner and Yuen (2005) discuss the relationship  
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57 between distribution of benefits and satisfaction of parties but these studies focus on inter-state conflicts.  
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3 or may not directly engage in violence but “support internal spoilers and spoiling tactics.”  
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5 Relatedly, more recent studies discuss the role of external supporters in shaping warring parties’  
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7 interest in negotiations (Kaplow 2016) and settlements (Maekawa 2018).  
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10 In summary, expanding the scope and definition of spoiling is pivotal for future research. This  
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12 project strives to illustrate that state interveners who have the opportunity to influence their  
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14 wartime ally will contribute to spoiling by aiding their ally if they are dissatisfied with policy  
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16 outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, for state interveners, facilitating implementation and  
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18 spoiling are both tools of influence at their disposal and are essentially two sides of the same coin.  
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### 22 **Impact of State Interveners on the Durability of Intra-state Peace Agreements**

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24 State interveners have a lasting influence on their wartime ally’s decisions, expectations, and  
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26 actions (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Cunningham 2010; Lemke and Regan 2004;  
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28 Pickering and Kisangani 2006; Regan 2002). Borrowing from Most and Starr’s (1989)  
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30 “opportunity and willingness” framework, I argue that this influence gives them the opportunity  
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32 to shape the trajectory of the post-settlement period. State interveners can induce compliance with  
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34 the peace agreement by increasing the benefits of committing to the agreement. They can also  
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36 make reneging on the agreement an appealing option by increasing the potential benefits of  
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38 defection. Intervener states’ level of satisfaction with the new post-agreement status quo designates  
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40 their willingness to help their former ally break down the peace agreement or implement it.  
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46 When warring parties sign a peace agreement, it brings significant policy change, namely, a  
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48 new status quo. A peace agreement often introduces a new administration, a new constitution, and  
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50 a new regime to the post-conflict state. Therefore, substantial policy changes will occur during the  
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52 post-agreement transition period. Once there is a new status quo, the nature of the relationship  
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3 between the intervener state and the signatory changes. State interveners, based on their level of  
4 satisfaction with the new status quo, choose a new course of action.  
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8 It is important to clarify two points regarding state interveners' satisfaction with the post-  
9 agreement status quo. First, following Kacowicz (1995, 267), I define satisfaction with the post-  
10 agreement status quo as "a commitment to keep the status quo." Similarly, dissatisfaction would  
11 be defined as a commitment to disturb the status quo. Second, I perceive the concept of satisfaction  
12 to be on a scale or continuum rather than seeing it as a binary concept. Therefore, when I talk about  
13 satisfaction or dissatisfaction of interveners with the post-agreement status quo in terms of levels  
14 of satisfaction, similar to Organski's (1958) "degree of satisfaction with the international status  
15 quo." Putting these two points together, a state intervener with a high level of satisfaction with the  
16 post-agreement status quo is also highly committed to preserving it. On the other hand, an  
17 intervener with lower levels of satisfaction will have a lower level of commitment to its  
18 preservation. Similarly, an intervener with a high level of dissatisfaction with the status quo will  
19 be highly committed to disturbing it. Yet, as the level of dissatisfaction decreases, the commitment  
20 to disturbing the status quo will decrease.<sup>3</sup>  
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38 A state intervener may be highly dissatisfied with the new post-agreement status quo due to  
39 various reasons. The intervener state's primary goal may have been to topple the government and  
40 may not have succeeded in the effort. The intervener may have underestimated warring parties'  
41 ability to settle and ended up with an unfavorable agreement as a result. Especially when multiple  
42 state interveners are involved in the conflict, some interveners are likely to be less satisfied with  
43 the outcomes of the peace agreement than others.  
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55 <sup>3</sup> For a longer discussion of satisfaction and how it relates to the concepts of opportunity and willingness,  
56 please see the Appendix.  
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3 State interveners may also miscalculate the policy outcomes of the agreement. Many  
4 agreements are designed to have specific terms implemented at a future date. Moreover, post-  
5 agreement elections are commonplace, and their results are widely uncertain (Flores and  
6 Nooruddin 2012; Matternich 2011). To revisit the Angola case, both the UNITA and the United  
7 States expected the UNITA victory in the 1992 general election. They chose to go back to the  
8 battlefield when the electoral outcome was disappointing.  
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12 As undesirable policy outcomes unfold in the post-agreement period, state interveners' high  
13 level of dissatisfaction with the new status quo is likely to motivate them to provide support for  
14 their ally. State interveners and former combatants have preexisting ties that allow state interveners  
15 to continue their support effortlessly if they so choose. Breaking down of a peace agreement can  
16 be the consequence of state interveners' interactions with their allies as they seek to improve upon  
17 the post-settlement status quo.  
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Distributional problems lie at the core of conflicts (Powell 1996). When combatants settle, the assumption is that the new distribution of benefits set by the agreement reflects the distribution of capabilities among combatants (Greenhill and Major 2007; Werner 1999). Information regarding the distribution of capabilities among combatants is revealed during the conflict, and parties negotiate for a new status quo that reflects this distribution (Fearon 1995). However, state interveners can disturb this fragile equilibrium by providing support for their ally instead of helping implementation efforts. The vulnerability of a disarmed opponent, coupled with the additional support of state interveners will shift the distribution of capabilities in one party's favor. These conditions are likely to encourage the former combatant to pursue renewed war for a new deal that reflects their perceived capabilities. In short, if a former combatant has reason to believe that they can renegotiate a better deal by returning to conflict, they will violate the peace

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3 agreement. Thus, state interveners can create incentives for their ally to go back to the battlefield  
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5 to renegotiate a better deal by aggravating distributional problems and commitment problems  
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7 inherent to negotiations.  
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10 State interveners are also capable of providing additional benefits for implementing the  
11 agreement and raising costs of defection for all parties. State interveners will economically and  
12 politically back an agreement that yields the policy results they seek. They can redirect their  
13  
14 wartime support to post-settlement stability efforts and make it conditional on signatories'  
15  
16 commitment to peace. Playing the role of "custodians of peace" (Stedman 1997, 51; Walter 2002),  
17  
18 state interveners can spearhead aid conditionality, trade, and investment flow to assist  
19  
20 reconstruction and redevelopment. This way, the expected utility of compliance to settlement  
21  
22 increases for all parties while preserving the current distribution of capabilities. Werner and Yuen  
23  
24 (2005), for example, point out that peace agreements supported by third-parties are vulnerable to  
25  
26 failure when those parties withhold their support in the post-agreement phase. If state interveners  
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28 "sweeten the deal" by supporting post-settlement restructuring, former combatants will not see any  
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30 incentive in revisiting the status quo.  
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38 In a large-N study, it is not always possible to directly link the breakdown or success of post-  
39 agreement peace to a certain actor. Attempts of spoiling may be covert, non-violent, or unclaimed  
40 by its perpetrators. Moreover, both efforts of spoiling and implementation can have incremental  
41 effects on post-settlement peace. That is, no one action can succeed in maintaining or spoiling  
42 peace but, altogether, they will have a cumulative impact on the durability of the agreement. This  
43  
44 is especially true when multiple actors, such as interveners, choose to fight or cooperate for  
45  
46 influence. Therefore, researchers argue for the analysis of contexts and outcomes of potential  
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48 spoiling (Greenhill and Major 2007; Zahar 2010, 265). I build on this eminent literature on spoiling  
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3 and conduct a large-N study examining state interveners' levels of satisfaction by looking at the  
4 economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period.  
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8 Signals are actions that allow recipients to infer about the preferences of the sender (Thyne  
9  
10 2006; Gartzke et al. 2001). State interveners' post-agreement behavior influences the durability of  
11 the agreement by signaling information regarding their level of satisfaction with the policy  
12 outcomes of the agreement. Before a former combatant decides to violate or commit to the peace  
13 agreement, they require some consistent post-agreement signal from the intervener state to reduce  
14 uncertainty as to whether the intervener will continue extending their support to their former ally.  
15 External states can make various promises regarding their support for post-agreement  
16 implementation efforts, or for aiding a revisionist signatory on the battlefield. Their promises  
17 acquire credibility when they reveal their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the post-  
18 agreement status quo through their behavior.  
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31 These signals can be traced in the type of interactions the state intervener is deeply invested in  
32 (Fearon 1995; Gartzke et al. 2001). Changes in the types of interactions that are valuable to the  
33 intervener in the post-settlement period signal their satisfaction level with the peace agreement.  
34 The stronger the level of satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with the post-agreement status quo, the  
35 stronger the positive/ negative signals intervener will send to their ally. The weaker the satisfaction  
36 or dissatisfaction level, the weaker and more negligible the signals will be.  
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45 Economic relations between state interveners and the post-agreement state are informative  
46 interactions per described because they are costly to build and break. Costs are sunk by various  
47 political and economic actors while establishing economic relations between two states, from built  
48 infrastructure to signed contracts and agreements (Gartzke et al. 2001). It is costly to seek  
49 alternative economic partners. Therefore, existing and future economic relations between the  
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3 intervener state and the post-agreement state are elemental to both partners (Bueno de Mesquita  
4 and Downs 2006; Regan 2002; Stojek and Chacha 2015).  
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8 Internal violence hurts and kills the population making up the labor force as well as  
9  
10 infrastructure. Physical destruction combined with instability and uncertainty shrinks the size of  
11  
12 economic activity in a conflict state (Bayer and Rupert 2004; Collier et al. 2003). Once the conflict  
13  
14 is settled, economic relations are expected to revive at a faster pace. Following capital flight and a  
15  
16 contracting economy, post-conflict transition environments are often in desperate need of  
17  
18 economic rebooting. Moreover, studies show that implementation is more likely if the post-  
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20 agreement state possesses the necessary economic capacity to implement provisions (Collier et al.  
21  
22 2003; DeRouen et al. 2010).  
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27 The intervener state can signal its endorsement of the peace agreement by facilitating existing  
28  
29 economic relations and building up new ones (Collier et al. 2003). Post-agreement economic  
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31 relations between France and Chad is a case in point. The French government benefitted from  
32  
33 peace agreement concluding the war between the government of Chad and the FARF (Armed  
34  
35 Forces for the Federal Republic) in 1998. The agreement settled the conflict in oil-rich South Chad  
36  
37 while the French-backed President of Chad, Déby, remained in office, serving French interests  
38  
39 economically and otherwise broadly. France sought to preserve and expand its trade relations with  
40  
41 Chad following the agreement, which also signaled its high level of satisfaction with the post-  
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43 agreement status quo (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Gould and Winters 2012).  
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48 A state intervener with no preexisting economic relations to the post-agreement state can also  
49  
50 step in to form new ones, signaling its high level of satisfaction with and support for the peace  
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52 agreement. With new post-agreement policies, new economic relationships can open up. The  
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54 investment made on strengthening economic relations indicates to the signatories that the  
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3 intervener state is supportive of the agreement and its policy outcomes. The complete  
4 transformation of economic relations between the United States and the post-agreement MPLA  
5 government in Angola is a case in point. Following the 2002 Luena Memorandum of  
6 Understanding that achieved durable peace in Angola, a strong economic relationship between the  
7 two countries quickly emerged (Romero 2003). The United States was highly satisfied with  
8 especially one post-agreement outcome – having access to Angolan oil. This satisfaction was  
9 reflected in a series of trade and investment agreements and a surge in trade, investment, as well  
10 as aid flows (Romero 2003).  
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22 It may also be the case that the new government and its post-settlement policies are no longer  
23 satisfactory to a state intervener who also happened to be a pre-agreement economic partner. A  
24 new post-agreement government is likely to renegotiate some or all economic deals after taking  
25 office, to the dismay of the state intervener. McGillivray and Smith (2004) demonstrate that  
26 leadership turnover is likely to trigger a change in trade relations between two states and that the  
27 change is especially robust if one of the states is a non-democracy. Alternatively, to signal  
28 dissatisfaction with post-agreement government policies, the intervener state can also impose trade  
29 barriers and sanctions. Such a measure would not only signal its dissatisfaction with the post-  
30 settlement policies but also alert its wartime ally that it will support its revisionist attempts.  
31 Additionally, declining economic relations would further weaken the post-agreement government  
32 by depriving them of trade revenue and by intensifying economic volatility and instability, leaving  
33 them vulnerable to a revisionist attack (Bagozzi and Landis 2015). In brief, economic relations  
34 following a peace agreement is a significant signal of high intervener satisfaction with the post-  
35 agreement status quo. While improvements in the economic relationship would signal a new or  
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3 improved alliance between the government and the intervener, its deterioration would signal  
4 souring of the relationship and a desire to support a revisionist signatory.  
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8 27 of 44 conflicts analyzed for this paper experienced more than one intervention.<sup>4</sup> When  
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10 multiple interveners are present, their levels of satisfaction as a coalition of influencers also shape  
11  
12 peace agreement durability. State interveners benefiting from the same economic policies of the  
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14 post-conflict state can cooperate and coordinate efforts to support the peace agreement. For  
15  
16 instance, following the Loma Agreement in 1999, the United Kingdom teamed up with the United  
17  
18 States to invest in Sierra Leone (Stojek and Chacha 2015). Trade relations, investment, and foreign  
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20 aid went hand in hand in the post-agreement period and served as a significant signal that these  
21  
22 two major powers were satisfied with the peace agreement.  
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27 In the post-agreement period, some interveners are likely to be benefitting significantly from  
28  
29 their economic relations with the post-agreement state while others are likely to be losing out.  
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31 While one intervener can seek to start or maintain a satisfactory economic relationship with the  
32  
33 post-settlement government, another intervener can support a party that may have been only  
34  
35 partially accommodated. Intervenors with different levels of satisfaction with the post-agreement  
36  
37 agenda are likely to disagree regarding implementation versus renegotiation of the peace  
38  
39 agreement. A satisfied intervener's implementation efforts are likely to be offset by a dissatisfied  
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41 intervener's promise of support to their wartime ally. This discussion of the linkage between  
42  
43 economic relations and settlement durability brings the discussion to the first set of hypotheses:  
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47 *Hypothesis 1a: As economic relations between the intervener state and the post-agreement state*  
48 *expand, the durability of the peace agreement increases.*  
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50 *Hypothesis 1b: As economic relations between each intervener state and the post-agreement state*  
51 *become more divergent from one another, the durability of the peace agreement decreases.*  
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56 <sup>4</sup> The data is from the Non-state Actors Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009; 2013).  
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3 Relations between states are an accumulation of all the exchanged politically cooperative and  
4 hostile comments and actions. They are meant to signal a level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction  
5 with the post-agreement policies of the recipient state. Every action or comment directed from one  
6 state to another aims to influence the recipient's future behavior regarding a certain policy.  
7 Collectively, a series of politically cooperative or hostile actions carried out on multiple  
8 dimensions create a consistent policy stance of the intervener towards the intervened in the post-  
9 settlement period. Albeit in different intensities, they each send a message indicating a level of  
10 satisfaction with the policy outcomes of the agreement. These signals may be costly to maintain  
11 or break, such as signing or breaking agreements, or military action or retreat (Fearon 1995;  
12 Gartzke et al. 2001). They can also be cheap signals which do not require high costs to maintain  
13 or break, such as verbal accusations or praises and restoring, augmenting, or breaking diplomatic  
14 ties (Thyne 2006).

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31 Intervener state's commitment to a cooperative or hostile political relationship with the post-  
32 agreement government on multiple political issues informs former combatants on whether the state  
33 intervener will help support or breakdown the peace agreement while the consistency of the signals  
34 reduces uncertainty. A state intervener engaging in cooperative relations with the post-agreement  
35 government in multiple political dimensions incurs high costs to preserve this relationship. These  
36 incurred costs signal signatories that the intervener will help implement the agreement. Similarly,  
37 an intervener state hostile to the post-agreement government incurs substantial costs signaling that  
38 hostility. Altogether, state interveners' attitudes are expected to have an impact on the durability  
39 of a peace agreement because they indicate intervener support or hostility towards agreement  
40 outcomes.  
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3 Angola and Mozambique are two cases illustrating how interveners' political behavior towards  
4 the post-agreement state affects the durability of peace. These two cases bear a striking  
5 resemblance in that both conflicts are examples of Cold War superpower intervention in Sub-  
6 Saharan Africa. As Soviet support began fading with the decline of the Soviet Union, both the  
7 MPLA government in Angola and the FRELIMO government in Mozambique renounced  
8 Marxism. This indicated a significant political change to the United States and other regional  
9 interveners that supported the armed oppositions, eliminating the hostility towards the Marxist  
10 governments.  
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21 In Angola, the MPLA renounced Marxism in 1993, following two failed settlements with the  
22 UNITA. While the ideological motivations shaped the support for UNITA and hostility against the  
23 MPLA, the resources under UNITA's control provided an economic motivation to interventions.  
24 UNITA's Savimbi had the resources he needed to renegotiate the status quo from selling diamonds.  
25 Thus, when the UNITA lost the elections following 1991 and 1994 agreements, it was unsatisfied  
26 with the post-agreement arrangement and returned to the battlefield. DR Congo (then Zaire)  
27 continued harboring UNITA soldiers while the US and South Africa continued funding the UNITA  
28 in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the United States did not recognize the MPLA's Angola as a  
29 legitimate state until 1993. Until the MPLA's strategic ideological transformation, all signals  
30 indicated that the UNITA was going to continue receiving support from the intervener states if it  
31 was unable to remove the MPLA from power via elections (Messiant 2002).  
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47 If we compare the past political behavior of the United States with the post-settlement behavior  
48 following Luanda Memorandum of 2002, there is a sharp change from a set of hostile actions to  
49 cooperative ones. The United States mediated the negotiations between warring parties and  
50 spearheaded aid conditionality. The neighboring interveners did not have any economic benefits  
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3 to extract from their support for the UNITA when the United States helped enforce sanctions on  
4 diamonds (Messiant 2002). All of these political behaviors of the US indicate a stable and  
5 consistent cooperative stance towards implementing the agreement (Romero 2003).  
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10 Just as the consistency of a single intervener's political behavior reduces uncertainty about the  
11 intervener's intentions, the consistency and convergence of multiple interveners' political actions  
12 increase their impact. The coordinated and simultaneous efforts of multiple interveners in multiple  
13 policy dimensions to implement the peace agreement should increase its durability. In the case of  
14 Mozambique, the interveners' multiple politically cooperative gestures during and after the Rome  
15 Process stabilized post-settlement peace. The warming up of relations between RENAMO  
16 supporters and FRELIMO began when FRELIMO renounced Marxism in 1986. The United States  
17 stopped funding RENAMO in the late 1980s. Kenya and Malawi got involved in the pre-  
18 negotiation stage to bring their ally RENAMO to the negotiation table and served as observers in  
19 the negotiation process along with the US and South Africa (Goncalves 1998).  
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33 Following the Rome Agreement, while the United States led the aid effort, post-apartheid  
34 South Africa established full diplomatic relations. President Mandela paid one of his first post-  
35 inaugural visits to Mozambique and was able to convince RENAMO to participate in the upcoming  
36 post-settlement elections, which proved pivotal to the stability of the post-settlement status quo  
37 (Goncalves 1998; Greenhill and Major 2007; Hanlon 2004). All of these post-settlement  
38 cooperative efforts demonstrated a clear trend of warming up relations via multiple cooperative  
39 political actions and gestures. There were no hostile actions against the implementation of the  
40 agreement to offset the implementation efforts and decrease agreement durability. On the contrary,  
41 intervener states often coordinated their efforts to help implementation. This final argument  
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3 regarding politically cooperative and hostile behavior of interveners brings the discussion to the  
4  
5 second set of hypotheses:  
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8 *H2a: As the intervener state's political behavior becomes more cooperative towards the post-*  
9 *agreement state, the durability of the peace agreement increases.*

10  
11 *H2b: As each intervener state's political behavior towards the post-agreement state become more*  
12 *divergent from one another, the durability of the peace agreement decreases.*  
13

## 14 15 **Research Design**

### 16 17 *Dependent Variable and Case Selection*

18  
19 The dependent variable is the duration of peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004.  
20  
21 The cutoff point is 2004 due to the temporal scope of the international political events data. The  
22  
23 data starts from 1985 to also include Cold War-era peace agreements in the dataset. The dependent  
24  
25 variable is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom  
26  
27 et al. 2006; Hogbladh 2011). The data format is transformed to analyze the unit of analysis, which  
28  
29 is the post-agreement-dyad-year. Each observation in the dataset corresponds to a post-agreement-  
30  
31 dyad-year, reaching a total of 448 observations. These observations cover ninety-eight agreements  
32  
33 in forty countries, concluding forty-four conflicts. The duration of the peace agreements ranges  
34  
35 from a minimum value of one year to a maximum of 17 years. The average duration is 4.06 years.  
36  
37 58 of the 98 peace agreements in the dataset (59%) have failed. Time periods run consecutively  
38  
39 from the signing of the peace agreement to the next conflict outbreak or to the end of 2004 when  
40  
41 the data is censored. All the peace agreements examined are listed in Table A8 of the Online  
42  
43 Appendix.  
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46  
47 A peace agreement or a negotiated settlement is a formal agreement that addresses and settles  
48  
49 all or parts of the disputed incompatibility between at least two warring parties in an internal armed  
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51 conflict (Hogbladh 2011). UCDP defines internal armed conflicts as incidents of violence  
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3 involving states and rebel groups that generate at least twenty-five casualties in a given calendar  
4 year, over some contested incompatibility classified as control over government or territory  
5 (Harbom et al. 2006). The peace agreement ends when one party walks away from the agreement  
6 and its provisions, when violence “clearly shows” at least one party has abandoned the agreement,  
7 or when a new agreement is signed (Hogbladh 2011). In order not to overestimate the number of  
8 agreements and underestimate the duration of peace, I only included the final agreement of a given  
9 peace process in the dataset.  
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19 I use the Cox proportional hazards model where the shape of the hazard model remains  
20 undefined. In the absence of expectations about the shape of the hazard rate, scholars recommend  
21 utilizing this model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Cox proportional hazards model assumes  
22 that the risk of survival and failure are proportional over time. I tested this assumption using scaled  
23 Schoenfeld residuals with all the models, and the results of the tests show that the assumption was  
24 not violated (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). As an alternative to the Cox Proportional  
25 Hazards model, I replicate the same models using the Weibull model and obtain similar results.  
26 Findings obtained using the Weibull model are available in Table 2 as well as the Online Appendix  
27 Table A1.  
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### 40 ***Independent Variables***

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42 *Economic relations between state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state:* I use bilateral  
43 trade volumes to capture the level of economic relations between state intervener(s) and the post-  
44 agreement state. I first identify all state interveners involved in the most recent conflict episode.  
45 As specified in the introduction, I define state interveners as states providing a civil conflict  
46 disputant (government or armed group) with military or economic support during conflict. I take  
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3 this variable from the UCDP Expanded Non-State Actors (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009,  
4  
5 2013).

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8 The economic relations variable then takes the value of the mean bilateral trade volume  
9  
10 between each state intervener and the post-agreement state annually for each post-agreement year.  
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12 The variable is taken from Correlates of War (COW) Trade Dataset (Barbieri and Keshk 2012),  
13  
14 where bilateral trade volumes are captured in US millions of dollars.

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17 *Divergence in economic relations between each state intervener and the post-agreement state:*

18  
19 First, I take the annual bilateral trade volumes between each state intervener and the post-  
20  
21 agreement state for each post-agreement year, as described above (Barbieri and Keshk 2012).  
22  
23 Then, the standard deviation of these values is taken for each post-agreement year to capture the  
24  
25 variation among different levels of economic relationships post-agreement state maintains with  
26  
27 each state intervener.<sup>5</sup>

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30 *State intervener political behavior:* I use political events data to capture state interveners'  
31  
32 cooperative or hostile political behavior towards the post-agreement state. I use international  
33  
34 political events datasets to code intervener behavior. In coding this variable and next variable, I  
35  
36 use two political events datasets due to their temporal scope. I utilize the World Event Interaction  
37  
38 Survey (WEIS) dataset for years from 1985 to 1992, given that the dataset ends in 1992 (Goldstein  
39  
40 1992). I utilize the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) Dataset (Bond et al. 2003, King and  
41  
42 Lowe 2003) for years from 1992 to 2004, given that the dataset spans from 1990 to 2004. Both  
43  
44 datasets use the same scale, and the IDEA Dataset bases its premise on the WEIS dataset (Bond et  
45  
46 al. 2003).<sup>6</sup> International political events data include “day-by-day coded accounts of who did what  
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54 <sup>5</sup> I further explain this variable through the example of El Salvador- FMLN, the conflict's three  
55 interveners, and The Chapultepec Peace Agreement in the Appendix.

56 <sup>6</sup> For data from 1990 to 1992 where data overlaps, I cross-checked data from WEIS with data from IDEA.  
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3 to whom” (Goldstein 1992, 369), as reported in the open press. These events are placed on a  
4 cooperation-conflict continuum that ranges from -10 (value assigned to most hostile action) to 8.3  
5 (value assigned to most cooperative action). Once I identify all interveners, I aggregate the data  
6 annually (for each post-agreement year) by adding all the cooperative and conflictual political  
7 event scores initiated by an intervener targeting the post-agreement state and divide by the total  
8 number of reported events. If there are multiple state interveners, I take the mean of state  
9 interveners’ annual event scores.

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19 *Divergence in state intervener political behavior:* I take the standard deviation of the annual  
20 WEIS scores of all interveners for each post-agreement year to capture the variance among  
21 different intervener states’ political behavior towards the post-agreement state.

### 22 23 24 25 26 27 ***Control Variables***

28  
29 *The number of state interveners:* This variable captures the number of all state interveners that  
30 supported a warring party during the negotiation period. As the number of state interveners  
31 increases, the number of potentially divergent interests seeking to influence policy outcomes also  
32 increases. Therefore, I expect this variable to exert a negative influence on agreement duration.  
33 This variable is obtained by adding the number of external government supporters and rebel group  
34 supporters provided in UCDP Expanded Non-State Actors Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009,  
35 2013). It ranges from 0 to 11, yet the majority of the conflicts examined did not have more than  
36 four interveners involved, and only two observations witnessed the involvement of 11 interveners.  
37 38 of the 44 conflicts (86%) in the dataset had at least one state intervener involved at some point  
38 in the process, and as indicated above, 27 of the 44 conflicts (61%) experienced multiple  
39 interventions.

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3        *Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita*: The variable contains the post-agreement state's  
4 annual GDP per capita. I take the ln transformation of this variable. GDP per capita is often used  
5 as an indicator of state capacity as well as the level of economic development (DeRouen et al.  
6 2010). High state capacity and level of economic development are expected to capture how fast  
7 the state rebounds from civil war. Therefore, I expect increasing levels of GDP per capita to  
8 increase the durability of a peace agreement. The data is from Gleditsch (2002).  
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12        *Ethnic conflict*: Some scholars argue that ethnic conflicts are more difficult to resolve  
13 permanently (Kaufmann 1996). The variable takes on the value of one if the conflict ended by the  
14 peace agreement was ethnic. The variable is from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009, 2013).  
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16  
17        *Conflict intensity*: It is more difficult for warring parties to bury the hatchet and for peace to  
18 be durable when the conflict has been intense and bloody. Therefore, I expect conflict intensity to  
19 influence peace agreement durability negatively. Reflecting the coding procedure of the dataset  
20 the variable is taken from, the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, conflicts with 25 to 9,999 deaths per year  
21 are coded as one, and wars that reached one thousand battle-deaths are coded as two (Harbom et  
22 al. 2008).  
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24  
25        *Natural resource conflict*: The variable takes on the value of one if the conflict being settled  
26 was a natural resource conflict as coded and defined by Rustad and Binningsbo (2012). I expect  
27 peaceful resolution in natural resource conflicts to have lower durability. Natural resources  
28 generally attract spoilers who may use these resources to go back to the battlefield and renegotiate  
29 terms. State interveners can also be among these exploiting actors.  
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31  
32        *Peacekeeping operations (PKO) deployment provision*: The variable takes on the value of one  
33 if there is a PKO deployment provision in the peace agreement. There is a sizable body of literature  
34 arguing that PKO deployment is an essential tool to minimize commitment problems between  
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3 former combatants (Fortna 2008; Walter 2002). Thus far, the entire spotlight on post-conflict third-  
4 party involvement has been cast on the PKO literature. Moreover, because the satisfaction level of  
5 the former combatants and the state interveners with the peace agreement might be shaped by what  
6 provisions are included in the agreement, I control for the effect of PKO deployment provision to  
7 see how it compares to the effect of the independent variables. The data for this variable and the  
8 following variable are taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011).

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17 *Power-sharing provision:* The variable takes on the value of one if the agreement includes  
18 power-sharing provisions. As discussed in the literature review, power-sharing is an important part  
19 of the current literature on peace agreement durability and inclusion of such provisions may affect  
20 actors' satisfaction levels with the agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

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27 *Cold War dummy variable:* As the ideological rivalry of the Cold War ended, many civil  
28 conflicts were concluded. This may influence the number and the duration of peace agreements.  
29 The variable takes on the value of one for the years between 1985 and 1989. Only six of the peace  
30 agreements were signed during this period.

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Descriptive statistics for the variables can be found in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

## Results

I have estimated three Cox proportional hazards models and one Weibull model (Model 4) that are clustered by peace agreement, and the results are reported in Table 2. Model 1 includes all four independent variables. Model 2 focuses on the effects of economic relations between state interveners and the post-agreement state on the durability of the peace agreement. Model 3 focuses on the effects of the political behavior of state interveners. Model 4 is a Weibull model that



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3 includes all four independent variables.<sup>7</sup> I report hazard ratios that can be interpreted based on the  
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5 cut point of one. Variables with hazard ratios greater than one decrease the durability of the peace  
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7 agreement and increase the risk of agreement failure. Variables with hazard ratios smaller than  
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9 one, on the other hand, increase agreement durability and decrease the risk of agreement failure.  
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15 *[Table 2 about here]*  
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17 Looking at Model 1, Model 2, Cox PH models, and Model 4, a Weibull model, I find support  
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19 for Hypothesis 1a and 1b. In line with Hypothesis 1a, an improvement in economic relations  
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21 between state interveners and the post-agreement state increases the peace agreement's durability.  
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23 The relationship is robust at the 0.05 significance level in both Model 1 and Model 2, and at the  
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25 0.01 level in Model 4. According to all three of these models, a million-dollar increase in mean  
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27 economic relations (operationalized using bilateral trade volume) between state interveners and  
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29 the post-settlement state increase the durability of the peace agreement by 1 percent. Moreover,  
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31 consistent with Hypothesis 1b, the divergence in economic relations between different interveners  
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33 and the post-agreement state harms the durability of settlement. This negative relationship is  
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35 significant at the 0.01-level in Models 1, 3, and 4. A million-dollar increase in the divergence of  
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37 economic relations decreases the durability of the peace agreement by 0.3 percent.  
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42 *[Figure 1 about here]*  
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44 Figure 1 includes two graphs obtained from Model 2. The first contains the hazard rates for  
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46 economic relations between the interveners and the post-agreement state. The second includes the  
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48 hazard rates for the divergence between each state intervener's economic relations with the post-  
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54 <sup>7</sup> I also replicate Model 2 (only economic independent variables) and Model 3 (only political independent  
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56 variables) using the Weibull model. The independent variables continued to be significant at the 0.01-  
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58 level in both models. You can find these models in the Appendix Table A1.  
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3 agreement state. The first observation to note is that the hazard rate for peace agreement failure  
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5 drops significantly in the first four years of the agreement in both graphs. According to the first  
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7 graph in Figure 1, if average economic relations (measured by the bilateral trade volume) between  
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9 state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state amounts to 191 million dollars (75<sup>th</sup> percentile  
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11 value) during the third year of the agreement, the hazard rate for the failure of the peace agreement  
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13 during the third year is 0.07. If this value increases to 1168 million dollars (mean value) in the  
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15 third year of the agreement, the hazard rate of agreement failure drops to 0. In comparison, the  
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17 hazard rate for agreement failure for the same year increases to 0.26 if there are no economic  
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19 relations between state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state. Supporting Hypothesis 1a,  
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21 improvement in economic relations between state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state make  
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23 a drastic difference in the durability of the peace agreement.  
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29 According to the second graph in Figure 1, if the divergence in economic relations between  
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31 each state intervener and the post-agreement state amounts to 1632 million dollars (mean plus one  
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33 standard deviation value) during the third year of the agreement, the hazard rate for the failure of  
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35 the peace agreement during the third year is 0.007. If this value increases by 1268 million dollars  
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37 (by one standard deviation) to 2900 million dollars, indicating significantly divergent economic  
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39 relations between each state intervener and the post-agreement state, the hazard rate of agreement  
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41 failure increases to almost 0.1. The hazard rate is 0 when there is no or low divergence (363 million  
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43 dollars which is the mean value) in economic relations. In line with Hypothesis 1b, as economic  
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45 relations between each state intervener and the post-agreement state become increasingly  
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47 divergent, the risk of agreement failure increases.  
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51 *[Figure 2 about here]*  
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3 Examining the effects of the political behavior of state interveners towards the post-agreement  
4 state in Models 1, 3, and 4, I find support for Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Consistent with Hypothesis  
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8 2a, as state interveners become politically more cooperative towards the post-agreement state on  
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10 average, the durability of the peace agreement increases. This relationship is significant at the 0.01-  
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12 level across all three models. One unit increase in average intervener behavior (captured by  
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14 political events score) decreases the risk of agreement failure by about 17 percent in Models 1 and  
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16 3, and by 24 percent in Model 4. Also consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the divergence in state  
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18 intervener political behavior towards the post-agreement state increases the hazard of peace  
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20 agreement failure. This relationship is also significant at the 0.01-level across all models. One unit  
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22 increase in the divergence in political behavior increases the risk of agreement failure by 18 percent  
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24 in Models 1 and 3 and by 24 percent in Model 4.  
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29 Seen in Figure 2 are two graphs obtained from Model 3. The first graph shows the hazard rates  
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31 for state intervener political behavior towards the post-agreement state, and the second graph  
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33 shows the hazard rates for the divergence in each state intervener political behavior. Once more,  
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35 the hazard rate for peace agreement failure drops significantly in the first four years of the  
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37 agreement in both graphs. Looking at the first graph in Figure 2, if the average intervener political  
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39 behavior (measured by political events score) takes its mean value of 0.03 during the third year of  
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41 the agreement, the hazard rate of agreement failure at its third year is about 0.11. One standard  
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43 deviation increase to 0.85 decreases the hazard rate of agreement failure in its third year to 0.09.  
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45 If intervener political behavior takes the value of -0.79 during the third year of the agreement, this  
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47 decrease (by one standard deviation) increases the hazard rate to 0.135. In line with Hypothesis  
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49 2a, as the political behavior of state interveners become more cooperative towards the post-  
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51 agreement state, the hazard rate of agreement failure decreases.  
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3 Examining the second graph in Figure 2, if the divergence in each state intervener political  
4 behavior takes its mean value of 0.57 during the third year of the agreement, the hazard rate of  
5 agreement failure is 0.105. If the divergence increases by 0.93 (one standard deviation) to 1.5,  
6 indicating a distance between each intervener's political behavior towards the post-agreement  
7 state, the hazard rate of agreement failure in the third year of the agreement increases to 0.135.  
8 Supporting Hypothesis 2b, as state intervener political behavior towards the post-agreement state  
9 diverge, the hazard rate of agreement failure increases.

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19 Moving on to examining the effects of the control variables on agreement duration, as the  
20 number of state interveners increases, the durability of the peace agreement decreases according  
21 to Model 1 and Model 4, the two models with all four independent variables. Yet, the direction of  
22 the relationship between the variables reverses in Models 2 and 3. The relationship is not  
23 significant in any of the models because it is not only the number of state interveners but also how  
24 convergent or divergent they are in terms of their satisfaction level with the agreement that affects  
25 agreement durability. The presence of divergence in economic relations and political behavior  
26 variables in the models, therefore, dampen the effect of the number of state interveners variable.

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38 GDP per capita, resource conflict, and PKO provision, and ethnic conflict variables are the  
39 four control variables that demonstrate significant effects on the durability of peace agreements.  
40 As GDP per capita increases, agreement duration also increases, and the relationship is significant  
41 at the 0.01 significance level in Model 4 and the 0.05 significance level in Model 1 and 2. The  
42 literature generally recognizes that economic development contributes to the stability of a post-  
43 agreement state. Including PKO operation provisions in the agreement increases its durability, and  
44 the effect is significant at the 0.01-level or 0.05-level (Model 3) in all four models. The literature  
45 has previously emphasized the role of PKOs in alleviating commitment problems. If the civil  
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3 conflict that the agreement concluded was a resource conflict, the risk of agreement failure is  
4 higher. The relationship is significant at the 0.1-level in Model 1 and 0.05-level in Model 3.  
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6 Resource conflicts are harder to resolve because natural resources can provide funds for one side  
7 and disturb the post-agreement distribution of capabilities between former combatants. Ethnic  
8 conflict decreases agreement durability across all four models, but the relationship is significant  
9 only in Model 4 at the 0.05 level.  
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17 As expected, intense conflicts have a higher risk of agreement failure on Model 4, yet a lower  
18 risk on the other models. The relationship is not robust in any of the models. Interestingly,  
19 including power-sharing provisions in the agreement increases the risk of agreement failure in all  
20 four models; however, the relationship is not significant. This may be because intervener  
21 satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the agreement affects agreement durability more than the  
22 provisions included in it since the likelihood of provision implementation also depends on whether  
23 the intervener will support the agreement and its provisions. Therefore, the inclusion of the  
24 independent variables dampens the effect of the power-sharing provision variable. If the agreement  
25 was signed during the Cold War, it has a higher risk of agreement failure. Cold War period is  
26 known for the proxy wars waged by superpower interveners and their allies, so the finding is  
27 expected. What is surprising is that the relationship is not significant. Similar to the agreement  
28 provision control variables, the presence of intervener-related independent variables dampens the  
29 effect of this variable.  
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#### 46 *Extensions to the Empirical Analysis*

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49 First, I address a possible concern of endogeneity. The same factors that affected initial  
50 intervention might also be affecting the durability of the peace agreement. To test for potential  
51 endogeneity, first, I run two seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models. This model evaluates  
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3 which variables are jointly affecting the outcome (durable peace agreements) and the treatment  
4 (intervention). These models use binary dependent variables. Therefore, the outcome variable in  
5 this model, *durable peace agreement*, takes on the value of one if the agreement survived for four  
6 years or more. I used four years as the cutoff point given the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 consistently  
7 show the four-year mark as the point in which the risk of agreement failure drops drastically.  
8 Moreover, four years is the average peace agreement duration in the dataset. The treatment variable  
9 is the *presence of state intervention* variable, which takes on the value of 1 if state intervention  
10 happened during the conflict. The four independent variables are not included in the estimation of  
11 this treatment stage. Similar to Models 1 and 2, I estimate economic relations independent  
12 variables and political behavior independent variables in two seemingly unrelated bivariate probit  
13 models (outcome stage) and the results can be found in Table A2 and 3 of the Online Appendix.  
14 The rho terms are not statistically significant in either of the models, which implies that the  
15 outcome equation and selection equation are not related. This demonstrates that endogeneity is not  
16 distorting the initial findings of the paper (Achen 1986; Gartner 2011). The only independent  
17 variable that is significant is *divergence in economic relations* variable, but the directions of the  
18 relationships are as expected in these two models.

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40 Second, I run a logit model using all independent variables. My dependent variable is a *binary*  
41 *peace agreement* variable where the variable takes the value of one if it survived longer than a  
42 year. Results show that three independent variables still significantly affect the durability of the  
43 peace agreement in the expected directions, with the exception of the *intervener political behavior*  
44 variable, which is not significant. The logit model can be found in the Appendix Table A4.

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51 As an alternative to using average economic relations and average intervener behavior, I used  
52 the *annual change* in average economic relations and intervener behavior and replicated Model 3.  
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3 While the effect of annual change in economic relations on the durability of peace agreements was  
4 significant at the 0.1-level, the effect of annual change in intervener behavior was robust at the  
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6 0.01-level. The model is in Appendix Table A5.  
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10 Furthermore, to see if the strength of the intervener has a role in the durability of peace, I run  
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12 Cox proportional hazards model using *economic relations with the US* and *US intervener behavior*  
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14 *variables* as independent variables, given that the US is arguably the most powerful intervener.  
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16 Both economic relations with the US and US behavior had a positive and significant effect on the  
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18 durability of the peace agreements. The model can be found in the Online Appendix Table A6.  
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22 Moreover, as an alternative to the number of interveners, I ran models using a binary variable  
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24 of *intervener presence*. Employing this alternative variable did not change the significant effect  
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26 independent variables had on agreement durability. This model is available in the Appendix Table  
27  
28 A7 Model 1. None of the peace agreements signed during the Cold War survived for four years.<sup>8</sup>  
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30 To see if this has any effect on the findings, Model 1 was reestimated without the Cold War  
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32 variable. The results did not change. These two models are available in Appendix Table A7.  
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36 Overall, these extensions to the empirical analysis can be summarized in three parts. First, the  
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38 rho values from seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models reveal that endogeneity is not altering  
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40 the initial findings of the paper. Second, using alternative variables to capture the independent  
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42 variables (such as using the annual change in relations or focusing on the US-post-agreement state  
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44 relations) did not change the results. Last, using alternative control variables (such as intervener  
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46 presence) or using different models such as the logit model and Weibull model reveal that the  
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48 findings are significant across different models and control variables.  
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56 <sup>8</sup> This variable was therefore excluded from some robustness checks in the Appendix.  
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## Conclusion

This study examined how state interveners influence post-agreement peace. It explored the economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state as signals of intervener satisfaction levels with the post-agreement status quo. The findings showed that improvement in these interactions significantly increases the durability of peace agreements. Moreover, the study also looked at the divergence between each intervener state's economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state to capture the disparity between each intervener's level of satisfaction with post-agreement policies in cases of multiple interventions. The findings demonstrated that such divergence adversely affects the durability of peace agreements.

This study builds on bargaining theories that concentrate on how shifts in the distribution of capabilities can generate incentives to change the post-agreement status quo, yet makes significant additions to the approach (Werner 1999). First, while shifts in the distribution of capabilities are often endogenous to these models, this study identifies an important set of actors that is capable and willing to support one party to aid such shift—state interveners. Second, the paper sheds light on state interveners' impact on combatants after the initial conflict has ended, and an agreement has been reached. Since commitment problems already plague the post-settlement period, any outside disturbance to the capability distribution can have a profound effect on signatory's incentives to implement the agreement. On the other hand, state interveners are also capable of alleviating these commitment problems by credibly signaling intent to aid implementation. Therefore, given the leverage they already possess over their ally, state interveners can be influential actors in the post-settlement period.



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3 The theoretical and policy implications of these findings are noteworthy. Theoretically,  
4 looking beyond internal actors and perpetrators of violence as the only potential suspects of  
5 spoiling broadens our horizon in terms of what spoiling is and what triggers it. Relying on  
6 observable implications of actors' behavior also makes large-N studies of spoiling possible.  
7 Searching for indicators and tools of spoiling rather than discrete action of spoiling also creates  
8 endless possibilities for research. Furthermore, these findings also support the argument that  
9 spoiling is but a tool in the arsenal of states to influence other states' policies. This is all unexplored  
10 and promising territory in civil conflict resolution literature.  
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21 From a diplomatic standpoint, it is crucial to recognize that intervener states are powerful  
22 actors not only during the conflict process but also in its aftermath. Neutral mediators can use this  
23 information to their advantage. If intervener states have high stakes in the negotiating country, it  
24 will be vital to include them in the negotiations as mediators. It may convert them into partners in  
25 the implementation process. The leverage they possess over the signatory can be an essential  
26 instrument for maintaining peace. Previous research also indicates that biased mediators are more  
27 successful in achieving settlement among warring parties (Svensson 2007) and enforcing them  
28 militarily (Favretto 2009). While mediation and peacekeeping are important to achieve a stable  
29 post-war state, they need to be enforceable. In this regard, state interveners can assist the peace  
30 agreement by alleviating commitment problems among warring parties and committing  
31 themselves to peace in the process.  
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**Table 1**  
**Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Dev</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Economic relations	448	1167.67	3563.12	0.00	20629.24
Divergence in economic relations	448	363.42	1268.28	0.00	9470.71
Intervener political behavior	448	0.03	0.82	-7.77	2.80
Divergence in intervener political behavior	448	0.57	0.93	0.00	8.43
No. of state interveners	448	2.25	2.10	0.00	11.00
GDP per capita	448	7.69	0.94	5.14	10.19
Ethnic conflict	448	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Intensity of conflict	448	1.45	0.50	1.00	2.00
PKO provision	448	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Power-sharing provision	448	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Resource conflict	448	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Cold War	448	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00


Table 2

**Cox proportional hazards models and Weibull model estimating the durability of peace agreements**


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Cox	Cox	Cox	Weibull
Economic relations	0.99 (0.00)**	0.99 (0.00)**		0.99 (0.00)***
Divergence in economic relations	1.00 (0.00)***	1.00 (0.00)***		1.00 (0.00)***
Intervener political behavior	0.84 (0.05)***		0.83 (0.05)***	0.76 (0.06)***
Divergence in intervener political behavior	1.18 (0.07)***		1.18 (0.07)***	1.24 (0.10)***
No. of interveners	0.96 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.05 (0.04)	0.96 (0.08)
GDP per capita	0.69 (0.10)**	0.69 (0.10)**	0.91 (0.11)	0.48 (0.13)***
Ethnic conflict	0.75 (0.24)	0.68 (0.20)	0.75 (0.23)	0.31 (0.15)**
Conflict intensity	1.06 (0.27)	1.02 (0.25)	1.04 (0.26)	0.85 (0.35)
PKO provision	0.55 (0.12)***	0.58 (0.12)***	0.58 (0.13)**	0.33 (0.13)***
Power-sharing provision	1.22 (0.31)	1.24 (0.31)	1.13 (0.29)	1.27 (0.46)
Resource conflict	1.73 (0.50)*	1.46 (0.43)	1.71 (0.46)**	1.91 (0.88)
Cold War	1.39 (0.69)	1.25 (0.59)	1.22 (0.65)	2.46 (1.83)
Constant				54.11 (130.46)
Chi <sup>2</sup>	53.69	48.24	46.25	
Log pseudo-likelihood	-281.76	-283.95	-289.37	-121.80
P				1.21
N	448	448	448	448

**Note:** Hazard rates are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

\*significant at 10%; \*\*significant at 5%; \*\*\*significant at 1%



**Figure 1:** Impact of intervener-post-agreement state a) economic relations (0, 75%, mean values) and b) divergence in economic relations on the hazard rate of agreement failure (mean, +1 std. dev., +2 std.dev. values). The values are in million dollars. The graphs are based on Model 2. Results obtained using Stata 15.



**Figure 2:** Impact of intervener a) political behavior (mean,  $\pm 1$  std. dev. values) and b) divergence in political behavior (0, mean,  $+1$  std. dev. values) on the hazard rate of agreement failure (based on Model 3).

## Appendix

### Table A1

Weibull model estimating the durability of peace agreements

	Model 1	Model 2
Economic relations	0.99 (0.00)***	
Divergence in economic relations	1.00 (0.00)***	
Intervener political behavior		0.79 (0.07)***
Divergence intervener political behavior		1.28 (0.12)***
No. of interveners	1.02 (0.07)***	1.10 (0.08)
GDP per capita	0.48 (0.13)***	0.76 (0.17)
Ethnic conflict	0.28 (0.13)***	0.48 (0.23)
Conflict intensity	0.85 (0.35)	1.11 (0.42)
PKO provision	0.36 (0.13)***	0.36 (0.14)***
Power-sharing provision	1.32 (0.49)	1.14 (0.44)
Resource conflict	1.64 (0.85)	1.95 (0.88)
Cold War	2.22 (1.59)	1.59 (1.28)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-125.96	-143.57
<i>P</i>	1.17	0.95
<i>N</i>	448	448

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A2****Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model****Estimated using economic indicators**

	Durable Agreement	Presence of intervention
Economic relations	0.00 (0.54)	
Divergence in econ. relations	-0.00 (2.17)**	
GDP per capita	0.25 (2.61)***	-0.66 (5.13)***
Ethnic conflict	0.20 (1.43)	-1.61 (6.46)***
Conflict intensity	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.79 (3.45)***
PKO provisions	0.28 (1.90)*	0.06 (0.29)
Power-sharing provisions	-0.23 (1.19)	-0.75 (2.75)***
Resource conflict	-0.37 (2.19)**	-0.76 (3.14)***
Population size		0.21 (3.27)***
Constant	-1.86 (2.03)**	6.89 (5.07)***
Rho	0.12 (0.11)	
LR test of rho=0	chi2(1) = 1.13	
Chi2	104.42	
<i>N</i>	448	

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A3****Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model****Estimated using political indicators**

	Durable Agreement	Presence of Intervention
Intervener political behavior	0.11 (1.40)	
Divergence in intervener political behavior	-0.01 (0.18)	
GDP per capita	0.17 (1.91)*	0.17 (1.68)*
Ethnic conflict	0.23 (1.59)	-1.11 (6.02)***
Conflict intensity	-0.07 (0.44)	0.24 (1.26)
PKO provisions	0.31 (2.12)**	0.58 (3.24)***
Power-sharing provisions	-0.17 (0.88)	0.16 (0.60)
Resource conflict	-0.44 (2.66)***	1.07 (4.99)***
Population size		0.16 (3.44)***
Constant	-1.20 (1.37)	-2.26 (1.97)**
Rho	-0.07 (0.09)	
LR test of rho=0	chi2(1) = 0.56	
Chi2	129.68	
N	448	

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A4**  
**Logit model**

	Durable Agreement
Economic relations	0.02 (2.63)***
Divergence in economic relations	-0.01 (2.91)***
Intervener political behavior	0.16 (0.79)
Divergence intervener political behavior	-0.43 (2.03)**
Intervener presence	0.56 (0.58)
GDP per capita	1.95 (3.65)***
Ethnic conflict	2.17 (2.67)***
Conflict intensity	0.90 (1.15)
PKO provision	1.79 (2.63)***
Power-sharing provision	-0.50 (0.62)
Resource conflict	0.30 (0.39)
Chi2	46.40
<i>N</i>	448

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



**Table A5**  
**Cox proportional hazards model**

Annual change in economic relations	1.00 (0.00)*
Divergence in economic relations	1.00 (0.00)
Annual change in intervener political behavior	0.22 (0.06)***
Divergence intervener political behavior	1.15 (0.07)**
No. of interveners	1.04 (0.05)
GDP per capita	0.81 (0.11)
Ethnic conflict	0.62 (0.17)*
Conflict intensity	0.92 (0.21)
PKO provision	0.66 (0.14)**
Power-sharing provision	1.25 (0.31)
Resource conflict	1.43 (0.38)
Cold War	1.47 (0.71)
Chi2	95.51
N	448

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A6****Cox proportional hazards model**

	Model 1
Economic relations with the USA	1.00 (0.00)*
USA political behavior	0.90 (0.03)***
No. of interveners	1.12 (0.05)***
GDP per capita	0.86 (0.11)
Ethnic conflict	0.63 (0.17)*
Conflict intensity	0.87 (0.23)
PKO provision	0.56 (0.12)***
Power-sharing provision	1.25 (0.31)
Resource conflict	1.44 (0.34)
Cold War	1.13 (0.61)
Log-pseudolikelihood	47.15
<i>N</i>	448

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A7

## Cox proportional hazards models estimating the durability of peace agreements

	Model 1	Model 2
Economic relations	0.99 (0.00)**	0.99 (0.00)**
Divergence in economic relations	1.00 (0.00)***	1.00 (0.00)***
Intervener political behavior	0.84 (0.05)***	0.84 (0.05)***
Divergence intervener political behavior	1.13 (0.07)**	1.17 (0.07)***
No. of interveners		0.98 (0.04)
Presence of interveners	1.23 (0.40)	
GDP per capita	0.70 (0.11)**	0.70 (0.10)**
Ethnic conflict	0.77 (0.23)	0.80 (0.24)
Conflict intensity	1.04 (0.27)	1.10 (0.27)
PKO provision	0.52 (0.12)	0.53 (0.11)**
Power-sharing provision	1.14 (0.28)	1.17 (0.29)
Resource conflict	1.58 (0.48)	1.73 (0.50)*
Cold War	1.25 (0.54)	
Chi2	51.78	50.21
N	448	448

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A8****List of Peace Agreements**

<b>Agreement name</b>	<b>Side A</b>	<b>Year</b>
Jalalabad agreement	Afghanistan: government	1993
Islamabad accord	Afghanistan: government	1993
Mahipar agreement	Afghanistan: government	1996
The Gbadolite declaration on Angola	Angola: government	1989
The Bicesse Agreement	Angola: government	1991
The Lusaka Protocol	Angola: government	1994
Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent	Angola: government	2002
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts	1997
The Washington Agreement	Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croat	1994
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	Bosnia and Herzegovina: Serb	1995
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	Burundi: government	2000
Ceasefire Agreement	Burundi: government	2002
Pretoria Protocol	Burundi: government	2003
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"	Cambodia (Kampuchea): government	1991
El Geneina agreement	Chad: government	1992
Tripoli 1 Agreement	Chad: government	1993
Abeche agreement	Chad: government	1994
Bangui-2 Agreement	Chad: government	1994
The Dougia Accord	Chad: government	1995

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3		Chad:	
4	National reconciliation agreement	government	1997
5		Chad:	
6	Donya agreement	government	1998
7		Chad:	
8	Reconciliation agreement	government	1999
9		Chad:	
10	Tripoli 2 agreement	government	2002
11		Colombia:	
12	Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejercito Popular De Liberacion	government	1991
13		Comoros:	
14	The Famboni Declaration	Anjouan	2000
15		Comoros:	
16	The Famboni II Agreement	Anjouan	2001
17		Comoros:	
18	Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros	Anjouan	2003
19		Congo:	
20	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilites	government	1999
21	The Erdut Agreement	Croatia: Serb	1995
22		DR Congo	
23		(Zaire):	
24	Lusaka Accord	government	1999
25		DR Congo	
26	Political agreement on consensual management of the transition in the	(Zaire):	
27	Democratic Republic of the Congo	government	2002
28		DR Congo	
29	Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of	(Zaire):	
30	Congo	government	2002
31		DR Congo	
32	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act	(Zaire):	
33		government	2003
34		Djibouti:	
35	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale	government	1994
36		Djibouti:	
37	Accord Cadre de Reforme et de Concorde Civile	government	2000
38		Djibouti:	
39	Accord de reforme et concorde civile	government	2001
40		El Salvador:	
41	The Chapultepec Peace Agreement	government	1992
42	Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz	Georgia:	
43	conflict	Abkhazia	1994
44		Guatemala:	
45	The Queretaro Agreement, Mexico accord 4/26	government	1991
46		Guatemala:	
47	The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights	government	1994
48		Guatemala:	
49	The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace and timetable	government	1996
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4			Guinea
5			Bissau:
6	Abuja Peace Agreement		government 1998
7			India:
8	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993		Bodoland 1993
9	Memorandum of Understanding with TNV		India: Tripura 1988
10	Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993		India: Tripura 1993
11			Indonesia:
12	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement		Aceh 2002
13	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo		Israel:
14	Agreement		Palestine 1993
15			Israel:
16			Palestine 1994
17	Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area		Israel:
18	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between		Palestine 1994
19	Israel and the PLO		Israel:
20	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo		Palestine 1995
21	B		Israel:
22			Palestine 1997
23	Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron		Israel:
24			Palestine 1998
25	The Wye River Memorandum		Israel:
26			Palestine 1999
27	The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II		Ivory Coast:
28			government 2003
29	Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords		Ivory Coast:
30			government 2004
31	Accra III		Liberia:
32			government 1990
33	Banjul iii		Liberia:
34			government 1990
35	Bamako Ceasefire Agreement, Banjul iii		Liberia:
36			government 1991
37	Lome Agreement		Liberia:
38			government 1991
39	Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement		Liberia:
40			government 1993
41	Cotonou Peace Agreement		Liberia:
42			government 1994
43	Akosombo Peace Agreement		Liberia:
44			government 1995
45	Abuja Peace Agreement		Liberia:
46			government 1996
47	Abuja II Peace Agreement		Liberia:
48			government 2003
49	Accra Peace Agreement		Macedonia,
50			FYR:
51	The Ohrid Agreement		government 2001
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3	Tamanrasset Accord	Mali: Azawad	1991
4	Pacte National	Mali: Azawad	1992
5		Mexico:	
6		government	1996
7	The San Andres Accords		
8	Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic	Moldova:	
9	of Moldova and Transdnistria	Dniestr	1997
10		Mozambique:	
11	The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)	government	1992
12		Niger: Air and	
13	Ouagadougou Accord	Azawad	1994
14		Niger: Air and	
15	Accord etablissant une paix definitive	Azawad	1995
16		Niger:	
17	Paris Accord	government	1993
18		Papua New	
19		Guinea:	
20	Bougainville Peace Agreement	Bougainville	2001
21		Philippines:	
22	Jeddah Accord	Mindanao	1987
23		Philippines:	
24	Mindanao Final Agreement	Mindanao	1996
25	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines	Philippines:	
26	and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Mindanao	2001
27		Philippines:	
28	GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace	government	1995
29		Rwanda:	
30	Arusha Accords	government	1993
31	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal el le	Senegal:	
32	Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	Casamance	2004
33		Sierra Leone:	
34	Abidjan Peace Agreement	government	1996
35		Sierra Leone:	
36	Lome Peace Agreement	government	1999
37		Sierra Leone:	
38	Abuja Ceasefire Agreement	government	2000
39		Somalia:	
40	Addis Ababa Agreement	government	1993
41		Somalia:	
42	Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation	government	1994
43		Somalia:	
44	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	government	1997
45		South Africa:	
46	Record of Understanding	government	1992
47		South Africa:	
48	Interim Constitution	government	1993
49		Sudan:	
50	DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement	government	1988
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4	Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period	Sudan:	
5	Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E.S. Rakhmonov,	government	2003
6	and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A. Huri	Tajikistan:	
7	The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and	government	1996
8	National Accord in Tajikistan	Tajikistan:	
9		government	1997
10		Uganda:	
11	Nairobi Peace Agreement	government	1985
12		Uganda:	
13	Gulu Peace Accord (Pece Peace Agreement)	government	1988
14		Uganda:	
15	Yumbe Peace Agreement	government	2002
16		United	
17		Kingdom:	
18		Northern	
19		Ireland	1998
20	The Good Friday Agreement	Yugoslavia:	
21		Kosovo	1999
22	Kosovo peace agreement 1	Yugoslavia:	
23		Slovenia	1991
24	Brioni Agreement		
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**The discussion mentioned in Footnote 3 continued:**

Most and Starr (1989) see two dimensions to opportunity, one based on the capabilities of the actor and the other based on the possibility to interact. State interveners possess both of these types of opportunities. Due to the time that may pass between intervention during a civil war and the signing of a peace agreement, it is technically possible for interveners to decline in their capabilities during that time. But, decisions regarding the allocation of resources is always a matter of choice. If the level of dissatisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is high enough for a state intervener because they are sufficiently harmed by this status quo, they will reflect this through their signals. They will seek to influence their allies to undo the harm the peace agreement inflicts upon them. The reverse is also true. If the level of satisfaction is high enough because the intervener is benefitting from the status quo, they will still reflect this through signals to ensure they can keep reaping the benefits.

**The discussion mentioned in Footnote 5 continued:**

For instance, El Salvador- FMLN conflict had three interveners during the conflict episode that ended in 12/31/1991 according to the NSA dataset. These three interveners were the US, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed in January 1992 between El Salvador government and FMLN. In 1992, the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and the US was 1096.59 million dollars, the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and Nicaragua was 66.49 million dollars, and the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and Cuba was 0. The average of these three numbers is 387.69 million dollars, which is the *economic relations between state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state variable's* value for 1992, and the standard deviation of these three numbers is 556.08, which is the *divergence in economic relations between each state intervener and the post-agreement state variable's* value for 1992.

**Memo:**

I would like to thank the editors and the reviewers again for their detailed comments and suggestions that improved the manuscript. Below is a list of changes I have made and their explanations, organized by Reviewer.

**Reviewer 1:**

1. I have made the corrections R1 suggested in their point #1, #2, and #5.
2. For point #4, the sentence was reformulated in the following manner and additional explanation provided:

“These events are placed on a cooperation-conflict continuum that ranges from -10 (value assigned to most hostile action) to 8.3 (value assigned to most cooperative action).”

3. For point #3, I have dedicated more space to explaining how I operationalize “the divergence in economic relations between *each state intervener and the post-agreement state*” variable and why. The discussion is on page 19.

I am also providing the following example to better illustrate how the variable is obtained: El Salvador- FMLN conflict had three interveners during the conflict episode that ended in 12/31/1991 according to the NSA dataset. These three interveners were the US, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed in January 1992 between El Salvador government and FMLN. In 1992, the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and the US was 1096.59 million dollars, the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and Nicaragua was 66.49 million dollars, and the bilateral trade volume between El Salvador and Cuba was 0. The average of these three numbers is 387.69 million dollars, which is the *economic relations between state intervener(s) and the post-agreement state* variable’s value for 1992, and the standard deviation of these three numbers is 556.08, which is the *divergence in economic relations between each state intervener and the post-agreement state* variable’s value for 1992. Due to space limitations, I am discussing this example here and on the Appendix, while informing the readers of this example on footnote 5.

4. I would like to thank Reviewer #1 for their encouraging concluding remarks.

**Reviewer 2:**

1. I have made the wording changes R2 suggested in their paragraph 1 and 2.
2. I have shortened the introduction as R2 suggested in paragraph 3.
3. I have referenced the two publications R2 mentioned in paragraph 4. I referenced these articles in the literature review’s “spoilers” section, as R2 suggested in the first round of comments. The references and the discussion can be found on page 6.
4. In line with R2’s last suggestion, I have added a concluding paragraph to the “extension of the empirical analysis” section. It can be found on page 29.

**Reviewer 3:**

1. In point 1, Reviewer 3 states: “Dissatisfaction is not automatically linked to willingness but it is possible, unless established otherwise, that dissatisfied interveners are not willing to take any action. Dissatisfied states in Senese and Quackenbush’s work were not assumed to renege on the peace agreement; their research proposed that dissatisfied states would either a) take an action or b) not take an action based on the characteristics of the states (hard or soft states).” In a what I believe is a related scenario, R3 gives me a case to consider: “Case 1: Although the intervener is dissatisfied with the situation in the post-conflict period, the current situation would work for the intervener better than their allies reneging on the peace agreement; thus, the intervener continues with the current level of political/economic aid.”

I have added a paragraph to the manuscript, which I believe resolves this issue that R3 raises. I have pointed out two things in regard to my conceptualization of satisfaction in this paragraph. First, I defined satisfaction with the status quo as a commitment to keep it (Kacowitz, 1995:267). Second, I have conceptualized satisfaction in a continuum rather than a binary concept, talking about it in terms of levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction (Organski, 1958). On one end of the spectrum is the highest levels of satisfaction, and on the other end is the lowest levels of satisfaction. This paragraph is on page 7.

While in previous versions of the manuscript, I often phrase satisfaction and dissatisfaction in “levels,” there also were instances where I used these words without referring to them in levels, which may lead to confusion. Therefore, I made sure I refer to satisfaction in terms of their levels throughout the manuscript. (I have also included Senese and Quackenbush in the literature review along with Werner 1999 and Werner and Yuen 2005).

What I try to convey in doing so is that given satisfaction is conceptualized in levels, and given that satisfaction levels are captured by economic and political signals interveners send, a very low level of satisfaction would be captured by a very weak signal which would not have significant effect on the dependent variable. This, I believe, is the scenario in R3’s Case 1 and bears a resemblance to Senese and Quackenbush’s “soft state.” But if the intervener is highly satisfied, they would be highly committed to preserving the status quo, which will be reflected in the signals they send.

2. In point 2, R3 states: “To establish the link between interveners’ status and opportunity (to increase/decrease political/economic aid), the author has to assume that the intervener is in a position where it could increase/decrease political/economic aid.” In what I believe is a related scenario, R3 gives me a case to consider: “Case 2: Although the intervener is satisfied with the situation in the post-conflict period, the intervener lacks resources to increase political/economic aid.

I have argued that state interveners’ opportunity to influence agreement durability is due to their former access to their ally and willingness to influence is reflected through signals that reveal their level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo (not through aid but

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3 through signals). Most and Starr (1989) see two dimensions to opportunity, one based on the  
4 capabilities of the actor and the other based on the possibility to interact. State interveners  
5 possess both of these types of opportunities. Due to the time that may pass between intervention  
6 during a civil war and the signing of a peace agreement, it is technically possible for interveners  
7 to decline in their capabilities during that time. But, decisions regarding the allocation of  
8 resources is always a matter of choice. If the level of dissatisfaction with the post-agreement  
9 status quo is high enough for a state intervener because they are sufficiently harmed by this  
10 status quo, they will reflect this through their signals. They will seek to influence their allies  
11 to undo the harm the peace agreement inflicts upon them. The reverse is also true. If the level  
12 of satisfaction is high enough because the intervener is benefitting from the status quo, they  
13 will still reflect this through signals to ensure they can keep reaping the benefits. I will add this  
14 paragraph to the Appendix due to space concerns and have indicated on page 7's footnote  
15 (footnote 3) that I will.  
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